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Introduction
Innovation policy aims to promote the commercial exploitation of new ideas as products, processes, and organisational techniques (OECD 2003) . The policy is increasingly prominent in EU and OECD countries because 'market failure' is judged to matter in this field. EU Member States are permitted to provide state aid to firms as long as it 'addresses a defined market failure, and the identified benefits outweigh the distortions to competition resulting from the aid'. (European Commission 2006) .
Market failures are particularly liable to arise in the generation and utilisation of knowledge; one example occurs when those who do not invest in research and development (R&D) nonetheless gain knowledge from others' investments. As a consequence of such market failures, social returns to R&D are estimated to be high and to exceed private returns by a wide margin (Griffith et al 2001; HM Treasury et al 2004; Wieser 2005 ).
Typically innovation policy evaluation has focused on the R&D input, rather than on the innovations themselves, and restricted the analysis to large manufacturing firms (Jones and Williams 1998, Hall and Van Reenen 1999) -although more recently coverage has been extended to manufacturing SMEs (e.g. Hall et al 2009) . Service as well as manufacturing firms employing fewer than 250 persons accounted for about one half of private sector jobs and turnover in the United Kingdom during 2007 (BERR 2008 Table   1 ); all types of SMEs matter for the economy. For these enterprises there is evidence that R&D surveys markedly under-report research activity and innovativeness (Kleinknecht 1987; Harris 2009) 1 . Lev (2001) noted that many innovative firms did not include any R&D expenditure figures in their reports. Instead of formal R&D, investment 3 in plant and equipment is more strongly associated with innovation by smaller businesses (Smith 2005; Skuras et al 2008) 2 . The approach adopted here to evaluating policy therefore is to consider the impact on self-reported innovation on both manufacturing and services SMEs, and how this innovation affects the economy.
The central question is whether 'reporting unit' level data in the Fourth Community
Innovation Survey (CIS4) (DTI 2006) shows that British SME innovation policy in was effective and efficient 3 . An effective policy is simply one that gets results -achieves 'additionality'-but the costs of doing so might exceed the benefits 4 . The resources deployed with an efficient policy yield social returns greater than their alternative uses.
In their recent survey Ientile and Mairesse (2009) concluded that an innovation policy was effective; business R&D investment grew in response to a tax credit in all the cases reviewed. Their observation that a unit of taxpayer's money sometimes generated less than a unit of additional R&D does not necessarily indicate the policy was inefficient.
The evaluation of this so-called 'bang for the buck' (Baghana and Mohnen 2009) need not even approximate an assessment of social efficiency, for it fails to take into account the social returns to the induced R&D. If returns to unsubsidised R&D at the margin are high (as for instance the survey of Wieser 2005 finds), then they may still be high (albeit reduced) on the tax credit that induced less than one for one R&D outlays. Links between policy spending and ultimate social returns must be established to evaluate policy efficiency, a contribution of the present paper. A second contribution is to distinguish between the impacts of traditional state support for SME innovation and of R&D tax credits. Studies such as Czarnitzki et al (2011) that estimate the impact of tax credits typically do not compare them with alternative innovation policies.
2 If this point is accepted then the Crepon et al (1998) model using R&D as an intermediate variable, standard for larger firms, is not appropriate for SMEs. 3 The UK CIS5 cannot be used for this purpose because the public policy questions were dropped. 4 Following HM Treasury (2003 p52) for the definition. "The success of government intervention in terms of increasing output or employment in a given target area is usually assessed in terms of its 'additionality'. This is its net, rather than its gross, impact after making allowances for what would have happened in the absence of the intervention."
Section 2 outlines UK state aid for innovation in an international context. Then section 3 discusses the method and the data. A key methodological problem is how to establish what supported firms would have done if they had not received state aid for innovation and conversely, whether or not unsupported enterprises would have innovated had they been helped. A propensity score matching solution is outlined. No less essential to policy evaluation is estimation of the impact of innovations. The section therefore considers how the growth of the firm responds to them, the measurement of the ultimate policy output and control function and instrumental variables estimation. The final subsection of 3 discusses the CIS4 data from which these equations are estimated.
In section 4 the results are reported and in the following section (5) the estimated parameters are employed to calculate a downward biased or conservative estimate of the overall impact and efficiency of SME innovation policy.
. Context of UK Innovation Policy
Official concern about possible uncorrected market failure in British innovation focused on Business R&D intensity, which was persistently lower in the UK than in the US, France or Germany over the decade after 1992 (DTI 2003 Table 1 .1). Firms in the UK were also less likely to be innovative, according to analysis of the aggregated Community Innovation Survey 3. Moreover the proportion of innovators in manufacturing sectors that received public financial support for innovation was significantly lower in the UK than in France, Germany and Spain (Abramovsky et al 2004) .
Most of the R&D discrepancy was attributable to lower British spending in a few manufacturing industries. In the UK service sector greater R&D intensity narrowed the gap, suggesting that an exclusive focus on manufacturing industry typical of most studies could be misleading. 42 percent of R&D performed in the UK was funded by UK businesses in 2005, a smaller proportion than other G7 countries and the OECD average.
Perhaps because of a low British propensity to invest in innovation, the UK had a That muted UK state support may be a reason for lower innovation rates was suggested by another aggregative cross-Europe CIS3 analysis. State aid was a statistically significant contributor to the fraction of innovative firms and to the proportion of innovative products in turnover (Jaumotte and Pain 2005b) . For the UK, unlike France, Germany and Spain, Griffith et al (2006 Table 3 ) using disaggregated CIS3 found that for all sizes of firms state funding had no effect on R&D intensity.
On the other hand the problem may lie in the measurement. Certainly a caveat is that international comparisons of state aid for innovation can be problematic. The EC Competition Directorate estimates UK spending to be low and falling (Table 1 ). Yet
British figures for R&D tax credits alone exceed the Directorate's estimates for 2005-7 (Table 2 ). The reason is that whereas the SME tax credit counts as state aid, the large firm tax credit support does not. need to make profits to benefit from the credit; if they incurred losses SMEs could claim a cash payment from the tax authority equal to 24 percent of their eligible R&D spending (Abramovsky et al 2004) .
Method and Data

The Innovating SME
Estimates of innovation policy impact require both measures of innovation output or outcome, and a model of the innovating firm. Possible innovation measures include patents, with three major approaches (Griliches 1990) . But patent applications are only one of many means of innovation protection. Patents are rarely used in services and by small firms so that this indicator will understate innovation in these sectors (Jaumotte and Pain 2005a 25) . Another method has been to identify and count 'significant'
innovations (Tether et al 1997) . A drawback is that there is no obvious way of comparing This self-reported approach, as employed by the CIS4 questionnaire to management, is probably currently the best available SME innovation measure for the UK. Innovations are here defined as products or processes that were at a minimum, new (or significantly improved) to the enterprise. The CIS definition of innovations does not require them to be profitable or accepted by the market 6 ; quality enhancement or cost reduction could come at the expense of each other, change can be damaging. In principle then it is 6 ' Innovation is defined as major changes aimed at enhancing your competitive position, your performance, your know-how or your capabilities for future enhancements. These can be new or significantly improved goods, services or processes for making or providing them.' Innovation here is measured as either or both of process or product innovation, either new to the firm or to the market.
possible that innovations, as measured, impact adversely or not at all on business performance.
How SMEs innovate will depend on how they acquire and utilise knowledge, how they invest in innovation and the challenges posed by this type of investment, in contrast to others (Hall 2009 ). Such investment creates an intangible asset, the firm's knowledge base, from which innovations and profits may be generated. Much of this 'knowledge capital' is implicit rather than formal, dependent upon the firm's employees. So, human capital of graduates should be an important, measurable, contributor to this base. SMEs may be especially likely to abstain from intramural R&D on grounds of excessive risk and limited access to finance compared with larger firms (Rammer et al 2009) .
Effective public support intended to counteract market failures, the central concern of the present study, will further add to an enterprise's resource base and so stimulate innovation. The in-part tacit nature of knowledge implies that personal contacts, imitation and frequent interactions for SMEs are particularly necessary for knowledge transmission. Collaboration with other firms and institutions will therefore matter Veugelers 2002, 2005; Roper et al. 2008) ; around 13 percent of UK firms in the CIS4 engaged in such arrangements (DTI 2006 25-6) . In short, the 'innovative SME' model proposed here controls for the direct influence of collaboration arrangements on an enterprise's chances of innovating.
Another control in the model recognizes that enterprise resources for utilizing knowledge will include human capital. Non-human resources devoted to knowledge production, utilization and innovation comprise R&D spending and investment in plant and machinery. New firms may be more likely than other businesses to have been established to exploit an innovation, so that age or date of formation could be an influence upon the chances of innovating. Larger enterprises are usually able to draw upon more indivisible knowledge or other resources than smaller, in which case firm size will positively influence innovation, though the relationship may be more subtle than the Schumpeter hypothesis about the greater innovativeness of larger firms (Acs and Audretsch 1988; Tether et al 1997; Hall et al 2009 where f is a cumulative distribution function.
There is strong theoretical and empirical evidence consistent with innovation causing or permitting exporting (BIS 2010 11-12) which would be a reason for excluding foreign sales from the controls in the innovation equation (1). But the association of these variables also may include an element of innovation being driven by exporting (BIS, 2010 54-62) . For this reason it could be desirable to include exporting as a control in the innovation equation in case the policy coefficient is altered by its presence.
Allocation of State Aid for Innovation
Whether traditional state aid for innovation is given to an SME depends upon management making an application and upon civil servants judging the application appropriate for the terms of the support. What determines an enterprise's willingness to apply for innovation aid and the inclination of the authorities to grant it? If the likely success of the aid is a determinant then everything that influences the probability of innovation might be included in the aid allocation equation. In addition, policy has a strong regional element in the UK and where g is a cumulative distribution function.
Possibly the process differs between the R&D tax credit and other support schemes because the receipt of the tax credit is more exclusively dependent upon enterprise management and less on officials. In which case, aid equation (2) should yield different parameters for the two types of state support.
Equation 2 can control for non-random allocation of innovation support to firms in a propensity score matching exercise (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Heckman et al 1997 : Oh et al. 2009 ). If enterprises were entirely randomly assigned to the two groups, state aided establishments and others, the difference in mean innovation outcome could be attributed to the state aid. Each firm getting state aid is therefore matched where possible with a business with an identical probability (propensity score) from equation 2 that did not receive aid 7 . All firms that can be matched are 'on support'. The difference in the mean innovation chances of these two groups is then attributed to the aid.
Matching analyses are based on two key principles: the conditional independence assumption (CIA) and common support. The first principle requires that any unobservable variation in innovation chances, after adjusting for the effects of whatever variables determine the allocation of support, has the same random distribution for aided and non-aided firms. Common support, the second principle, necessitates that comparable observations are available for both groups; if size is a determinant of state aid, some big and some small firms must receive aid while some of both categories must not 8 .
A test of how well the matching is undertaken is to compare the means of the characteristics determining the propensity score before and after matching. Firms with graduates in their workforces are more likely to innovate than others. Hence before matching firms receiving innovation support more probably employ graduates than unaided establishments. But after matching the chances of employing graduates should be similar between state aided and control groups -even though the matching is on the score and not on the determinants of the score 9 .
Innovation and SME Growth.
Commonly models of the impact of innovation and knowledge seek to explain labour productivity (for example Belderbos 2004 , Roper et al 2008 . to the increase in welfare from innovation and it is also readily measurable with CIS4.
Successful innovation either lowers an SME's costs or expands their demand or both. If a firm faces a perfectly price inelastic demand then the proportionate cut in price from a successful process innovation would match the proportionate increase in welfare.
Productivity increase would be a good proxy for the impact of the innovation. But profit maximisation requires that firms operate in the output range where they face a price elastic demand. Consequently a cost and price reduction expands sales and turnover, and productivity increase understates the value of the innovation. How much expansion takes place depends upon the price elasticity of demand.
An impact assessment based solely on labour productivity and a production function is especially mis-specified when a product innovation shifts the enterprise's demand function. Profit maximisation normally ensures that sales volume of the now improved products expands but, with a constant elasticity of demand and constant returns to scale, the price remains unchanged. Turnover and output (or value added) increase, but measured productivity does not; only welfare or 'utility' productivity rise (see Appendix A). A conventional productivity index will markedly understate the welfare effect of such innovations.
The output increase from innovation is more closely related to the 'surplus' measures of well-being from welfare economics; consumers' surplus and profits. The relation varies with the average price elasticity of demand faced by the firm in the short run. Tellis'
(1988) meta-analysis of several hundred studies concluded that the mean price elasticity faced by firms was in the region of -2.5. With constant elasticity demand functions and constant returns to scale, in this region the proportionate change in sales revenue is a downward biased measure of welfare expansion in relation to initial turnover -but considerably less biased downwards than change in productivity (Appendix A).
Turning now to the model in which the impact of innovation on enterprise growth is Unbiassed estimates of the effect of innovation on turnover require that the disturbance term, u i3 , is uncorrelated with innovation. Unobserved especially innovative managements may also be less interested in, or competent at, running a large firm than 13 other management teams; if so there would be a negative association between the output disturbance term and the innovation variable. Measuring output or turnover before and after the innovation (in 2002 and 2004 in the present study) and considering the difference for innovators and non-innovators goes some way to eliminating this problem. Unobserved management of the above type would be a common factor that was eliminated by differencing (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000) . However this 'difference in differences' approach does not address the case where, say, unobserved innovative management are not very interested in, or good at, growth.
A potential solution to such bias in this instance is to instrument innovation to obtain the estimate of the impact on output growth. In practice good instruments may not be available and invalid or 'weak' instruments estimate more biased and inconsistent IV The policy effect then is deduced from the two basic equations (1) . and the impact of innovation on turnover/profits plus consumers' surplus (on the assumptions discussed above). The product of these two parameters gives the average impact of policy on those enterprises that received support. Multiplying by the proportion of firms that obtained state aid and their contribution to the performance measure yields the boost due to policy. Then if we know how much is spent on policy this outcome may be interpreted as the return.
Data and Model Specification
Data for the present exercise comes from the Fourth Community Innovation Survey (CIS4) and the variables are summarised in Sampling weights for CIS4 were created by using the inverse sampling proportion in each stratum 13 . These weights may correct for bias introduced by different response rates across enterprise size, sector or region, in particular compensating for undersampling of small businesses. Formally CIS4 includes enterprises as small as ten employees, although in the unweighted data set of the present analysis, ten percent employ ten or fewer.
In the empirical specification of (1) Just under one in ten SMEs received some form of state innovation aid (Table 3) . R&D tax credits were more of a minority interest, with slightly less than one half of firms that received state aid also claiming the credits. More than half of large businesses stated that they innovated in the period 2002-4, compared with little more than one third of SMEs.
SMEs more probably started recently and recorded the higher mean ratios of intramural R&D to turnover and investment. Smaller establishments were less likely to utilise graduates but those that did employed sufficient to ensure that the average proportion of graduate workers, at just under 17 percent, did not vary much between the two size categories. All forms of extra-firm collaboration for innovation were more common with large enterprises.
A comparison of mean turnover and employment growth across enterprise size indicates that, although on average SMEs' turnover rose more slowly, labour productivity grew faster. Large establishments were likely to be members of an enterprise group whereas small establishments were not (three out of four were not).
Consistent with their greater probability of a more recent start, small firms were unlikely to export (not much more than a one in four chance) while almost half of large establishments did so.
The foregoing data provide the variables for isolating the impact of receipt of state aid on innovation and, indirectly, on growth. For each enterprise there are two equations of fundamental interest, determining the likelihoods of innovation and growth, and one equation, determining the chances of state support that may be necessary to ensure such support can be treated as exogenous to innovation.
Results
State Aid and Innovation
The first relationship, how state aid affects innovation by SMEs, is estimated by nearest neighbour propensity score matching ( Table 4 , among those not receiving innovation aid the predicted probability of receiving it (not tabulated) ranges from effectively zero to one with a mean of 0.102 and a median of 0.072. Among those granted innovation aid the predicted probability ranges from 0.01 to 1 with a mean of 0.25 and a median of 0.19. Thus the zone in which there is no 'common support' given by those not receiving aid is extremely small.
Nearest neighbour matching takes each of the SMEs receiving innovation aid and identifies the firm not accepting aid with the most similar propensity score. To ensure the quality of the matches a tolerance for comparing propensity scores is imposed. In table 4 in all but one instance (eq. iv) a 0.001 calliper is set; where the propensity score of an aid-receiving firm falls beyond this bound for a near comparator, the firm remains unmatched and is dropped from the sample. There is a trade-off between more precise matching and a smaller sample. Since the present sample is quite large, the calliper approach is generally preferred. In equation (iv), without the calliper, although the mean gap between the probability score and that of the nearest neighbour is only .0006, or .06 percent, the 99 th percentile gap is .012 or 1.2 percent. The cost of using the calliper is seen in the fifth row of observations seemed a worthwhile price to achieve a closer match.
Because the state aid equation specification may affect the results, a version ('restricted') (not tabulated) excluding the collaboration arrangements of the SME was compared with a version including them ('full')(Appendix B). The fuller specification is a better predictor of support and reduces the absolute bias after matching relative to the restricted specification in the weighted callipered equations (compare estimated equations (ii) and (iii) Table 4 ) from 3.23 to 2.49 percent. Equations (v) and (vi), the unweighted versions of equations (ii) and (iii), might suggest a preference for the larger coefficient of 0.3, for eq (v) has the lower bias. But the aim of the present exercise is to establish a conservative or downward biased estimate of the policy impact so equation (iii) (or (vi)) is preferred.
the 5 percent (but not the one percent) level after matching between treated and control SMEs for one region and one SIC, and raises the estimate of the effect on innovation of support. For these reasons, and because the difference was not significant at the one percent level, the specification of Table 4 iii was preferred.
As for the tax credit, the matching exercise suggests that there is no significant difference between tax credit effects (0.296) and non-tax credit innovation aid impact (0.298) using the unweighted estimates (Table 5 ). These are closer than the weighted estimates (which are 0.303 -equation iv-for the tax credit and 0.274 -equation iii -for other innovation aid) for which we do not have standard errors, but with the unweighted standard errors of 0.02 the difference between the effects of the two types of aid would not be significant. In the light of the greater cost of the tax credit support, as well as the supposed greater efficiency, this finding is striking; a significantly larger tax credit 'treatment effect' would be expected. Because all these estimates are obtained from cross-section rather than panel data, one interpretation of the similarity of the probit and propensity score measurement parameters is that both are upward biassed -on the grounds that the probits do not control for unobserved heterogeneity (discussed in section 3.2). In the following section the sensitivity of the policy conclusion to a halving of the parameter is therefore tested. Alternatively the similarity of the estimates could be interpreted as indicating the unimportance of such heterogeneity in this case.
TABLE 6 HERE
Innovation Impact
The second key relationship to be estimated is how innovation affects the expansion of the innovating enterprise. In the growth equations for SMEs in Table 7 , equation (i) provides a test of the endogeneity of innovation to the growth of the firm. The innovation residuals in the control function just reject endogeneity at the five percent level with a two tailed test. The innovation coefficient itself is large, at 0.19, and significantly greater than zero at the one percent level (equation (i)). But with a large standard error, it is not significantly different from the OLS coefficient of 0.073 at the 95 percent level (equation (iii) Table 7 ). The IV estimate (equation (ii)) of the innovation coefficient is smaller than the control function estimate, at 0.1483, significant at the 2.2 percent level 18 . But even more than the control function estimate, the wide standard errors leave considerable doubt as to the true value of the coefficient. It is however worth noting that a similar specification estimated on CIS4 large firm data does not reject the null that the innovation coefficient is zero, implying that pooling firms of all sizes for these innovation impact estimates could be misleading. 18 The higher value of the IV estimate of the innovation coefficient is consistent with (unobserved) innovative SME managements being less prone to expand their firms than others. The first stage F statistic of 80 is not consistent with weak instruments, nor is the significance of Shea's partial R 2 . The Hanson J coefficient does not reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (uncorrelated with the disturbance term) and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
If the innovation residual coefficient of (i) is judged statistically insignificant, IV estimation is inappropriate. Certainly this is the line to take when, as here, the objective is to establish a conservative or downward biased estimate of innovation policy impact. On these grounds the innovation coefficient of the OLS equation (iii) Table 7 here
The other coefficients are of less fundamental interest, other than as controls.
Whether or not they are biased by unobserved heterogeneity is therefore not critical to estimating the impact of innovation policy. Nonetheless there appears to be a consistently large positive growth effect across estimation methods from being a new firm. Other substantial impacts are associated with membership of an enterprise group and employing graduates. Surprisingly perhaps, exporting appears to make no difference to growth of turnover.
SMEs in mining and quarrying, the base case, were in a relatively fast growing sector, not different from financial intermediation and significantly greater than most manufacturing sectors. Only SMEs in electricity gas and water were likely to grow faster.
The sole significant effect at the regional level was the slower growth of SMEs in the West Midlands.
Was Innovation Policy Efficient?
The return to the state support for innovation by SMEs depends on the boost to wellbeing from innovation. In section 3.3 and Appendix A it is contended that change in turnover or revenue (∆R) is the most appropriate available indicator of change in wellbeing, as measured by consumers' surplus and profits. This then is the return to policy. The counterfactual policy is no state support. So the number of firms (n) actually receiving aid may be denoted by the increase in state support (∆S) from the counterfactual position (where S is a binary variable as defined in section 3.2 above).
The proportionate increase in turnover induced by innovation aid for the average firm is the proportion of SMEs aided (n/N) times the product of two parameters. They are, first from equation (1), the increase in the chances of the average firm innovating (∆ Pr(I)) as a consequence of receiving state aid for this purpose (defined as  =∆ Pr(I)/∆S)). The second, from equation (3), is the average SME's lift to turnover as a result of innovating (defined as k = ∆ R/(∆I.R)). The result of state supported innovation for the average SME is then; (4) where ∆R is the measure of induced SME profit (Π) and the consumers' surplus (CS).
Aggregating over the whole economy ∆R must be evaluated in terms of value added.
Relevant GDP is N.v, where v is the average SME value added and N is the number of SMEs. Average SME value added is less than average turnover. The consumers' surplus and profit measures are calculated as proportions of turnover (∆ R/R ≤ ((∆CS+∆Π)/R)) and so are multiplied by R/v to convert them to into GDP units. This allows (4) to be expanded to yield the value of the welfare gain -the product of the turnover boost to the average (non-micro) SME (∆R) and the number of SMEs (N). excluding it would impart a downward bias. The latter option is preferred here. So SME innovation policy is assumed to be working on 27.5 percent of private sector output in 2002 or (£830 billion*0.275=) £228 billion. This must equal the product of the average value added per SME (v) and the number of (non-micro) SMEs (N). The ratio R/v for the private sector SMEs was about 2.75 in 2002 21 . The proportion of SMEs aided was (n/N=9.5 percent), the total innovation impact on output (in Table 7 estimated equation. (iii)) is k=0.0733, and the innovation parameter for total innovation support (Table 4 equations (iii) or (vi)) is =0.27.
N.v.(R/v).(∆R
Using equation (5), where ∆R is welfare improvement (= increase in consumers' surplus plus profit), the return to state aid in terms of GDP is 1986,) to get an approximation to the SME allocation. Add in SME R&D tax credits of about £0.2 billion p.a. to reach approximately £ 320 million p.a. as the cost of SME innovation policy 2002-4. spillovers, and that the output impact of an innovation may well continue after the three year period considered 23 .
= (relevant GDP). (R/v).(∆ R/∆I. R).(∆ Pr(I)/∆S
According to the SME equation much of the return to innovation could apparently be earned without the expensive tax credit 24 . Tax credits had a smaller take up than other innovation policies (4.2 percent of SMEs compared with 9.5 percent, Table 3 ). Table 5, (propensity score matching) and Table 6 (the weighted innovation equation) suggest that the tax credit impact on innovation was unlikely to have been significantly stronger than other innovation policy instruments, despite the greater expense. Perhaps the spread of information about the tax credit in due course would raise innovation rates, but presumably at additional public cost.
Conclusion
Three basic equations have been proposed to link innovation support, innovation outcomes and SME growth. By focussing on self-reported innovation the approach ensures a wider coverage of innovative SMEs that respond to policy than included in most studies. The large (around 10,000 observations) representative UK SME sample includes both services and manufacturing businesses, although micro firms are largely excluded.
In view of the inevitable uncertainties in evaluating SME innovation policy, the method has been to aim for a downward biased or conservative estimate of impact. The study addresses the policy counterfactual of how an enterprise would have performed if it had not received innovation support, when actually it did, with propensity score matching.
The matching exercises generated broadly similar estimates of the impact of UK state aid upon innovation, the first key parameter, to those from conventional single equation approaches. 23 The profits and consumers' surplus performance measure are ratios with turnovers as denominators so the same turnover to value added ratio is needed to calculate the impact in these terms. 24 Unless tax credits triggered innovations that were disproportionately productive.
To justify the use of the turnover SME performance variable, the paper discussed how policy benefits could best be defined and measured, a theme generally left implicit in the literature. UK SME performance and innovation equations show that self-reported innovation significantly predicts differences in enterprise turnover growth. Estimates of the second key parameter, the effect of innovations on growth, indicate strong and significant boosts to SME revenue. There is no significant difference between the effects on SMEs of R&D tax credits and other state aid for innovation. Since the much smaller take up implies that the tax credit is an expensive instrument, the findings are consistent with Baghana and Mohnen's (2009) assessment of considerable deadweight losses from such credits.
Comparing the calculated payoffs with the outlays implies that the returns to British innovation policy 2002-4 were nonetheless very substantial. Because no attempt is made to calculate spillover benefits between enterprises, the gains for micro enterprises or the persistence of induced innovation effects beyond the three year window, the estimates of policy impact will be downward biased for these reasons. The bias reinforces the conclusion that SME innovation policy is efficient as well as effective.
Also, the finding supplements the consensus view of high social returns to R&D by extending it to include other forms of innovation effort, as far as SMEs are concerned. A reason the estimated returns are so large is that, unlike the conventional productivity approach, the performance measure here does take into account demand shifting by innovation and measures welfare effects more appropriately. Also the greater coverage of firms without formal R&D recorded markedly expands the number of SMEs assessed as responding to state innovation aid. These very high returns found suggest that, even in times of public spending cuts, persisting with SME innovation policy would be prudent. 
Product Innovation
To fix concepts first a diagrammatic presentation with linear demand is given. Product . So the net social benefit from the innovation is the change in consumers' surplus ZCP 2 -XAP 1 plus the change in the firm's profit P 2 CDMC -P 1 ABMC.
The change in the firm's revenue or turnover is the sum of the profit increase and the cost rise or displacement. In the long run, when there are no effective entry barriers, this profit may be eliminated as competition shifts back the demand curve.
In figure A1 , strictly Q 1 is a different entity from Q 2 , transformed by the product innovation. The market would have been willing to pay at the margin more for the new product at volume Q 1 than for the old product. This greater willingness to pay is represented by the upward shift in the demand curve at Q 1 . However in models without an explicit demand function, this will not be identified. What will be observed are equilibria P1, Q1 and P2, Q2 and these, after due allowance for the extra resources absorbed, will provide the estimated productivity impact of the innovation. Inspection of figure A1 as drawn suggests some productivity increase, more revenue in relation to costs, would be estimated. But in the constant elasticity case considered below there is no equilibrium price increase and therefore measured productivity (the ratio of revenue to costs) does not change at all, even though welfare has risen substantially. Hence productivity and production function estimates of innovation without enterprise demand functions are likely markedly to under-estimate returns to innovation. The profit maximisation first order condition is
In this case with no change in marginal costs the proportionate shift in MR or the demand function is the same as the proportionate increase in Q; a 2 /a 1 = Q 2 / Q 1 where the shift in MR is given by the change in a, a 2 >a 1 .
And P 2 /P 1 = MC 2 /MC 1
With no change in marginal cost by assumption, price is unaltered.
The proportionate revenue change is therefore the same as the volume change.
Similarly for profits:
The profit to turnover ratio falls as the elasticity b increases.
With price held constant at P 1 say, the difference in consumers' surplus (CS) is Consumers' surplus increase in relation to revenue is;
The total welfare increase includes profits as well as consumers' surplus, and this tends to raise the welfare increase above the turnover or revenue expansion proxy but by less as the elasticity rises (in absolute value). When b=-2.5, an increase in turnover of 10 percent is associated with an rise in the ratio of consumers' surplus to revenue of 16.66 percent
26
. Adding the increase in profits;
amounting to 4 percent, the welfare change reaches 20.6 percent. For all plausible elasticities, turnover increase from product innovation understates the rise in welfare.
Process Innovation
In Figure A2 a process innovation shifts the cost function from MC 1 to MC 2 . Turnover increases from P 1 EQ 1 O to P 2 FQ 2 O. The increase in consumers' surplus is P 1 EFP 2 and in profits P 2 FDMC 2 -P 1 EBMC 1 . 'Displacement' could be negative, resource use could be lower, if MC 1 BCMC 2 >CDQ 2 Q 1 . With an elasticity of b=-2.5 turnover increases by more than the marginal costs fall, but with an elasticity of b=-1.5, turnover increases by less.
The profit (Π) identity is
Profit increases proportionately with turnover.
The change in consumers' surplus (CS) as a proportion of initial revenue (R 1 ) consequent upon the innovation-induced price fall from P 1 to P 2 is
The proportionate fall in marginal costs from the process innovation is the same as the proportionate decline in price. When b=-2.5 a 10 percent fall in prices and marginal costs raises the ratio of consumers surplus to revenue by 11.3 percent. (P 2 / P 1 ) b+1 can be written in terms of revenue by substituting in the demand function, as (Q 2 P 2 )/Q 1 P 1 = R 2 /R 1 .
So the relationship of this revenue or turnover to the consumers' surplus measure is
Revenue change overstates the gain in CS/R from process innovation by 50 percent with an elasticity of -2.5 but total welfare change includes the additional profit as well;
When b=-2.5 a 15 percent increase in revenue from a process innovation ( representing a 10 percent increase in CS/R) is associated with a 6 percent rise in the profit to pre-innovation revenue. Adding the two welfare components and using Tellis's (1988) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
